Abstract: Outliers in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are sensor nodes that issue attacks by abnormal behaviours and fake message dissemination. However, existing cryptographic techniques are hard to detect these inside attacks, which cause outlier recognition a critical and challenging issue for reliable and secure data dissemination in WSNs. To efficiently identify and isolate outliers, this study presents a novel outlier detection and countermeasure scheme (ODCS), which consists of three mechanisms: (i) abnormal event observation mechanism for network surveillance; (ii) exceptional message supervision mechanism for distinguishing fake messages by exploiting spatiotemporal correlation and consistency and (iii) abnormal behaviour supervision mechanism for the evaluation of node behaviour. The ODCS provides a heuristic methodology and does not need the knowledge about normal or malicious sensors in advance. This property makes the ODCS not only to distinguish and deal with various dynamic attacks automatically without advance learning, but also to reduce the requirement of capability for constrained nodes. In the ODCS, the communication is limited in a local range, such as one-hop or a cluster, which can reduce the communication frequency and circumscribe the session range further. Moreover, the ODCS provides countermeasures for different types of attacks, such as the rerouting scheme and the rekey security scheme, which can separate outliers from normal sensors and enhance the robustness of network, even when some nodes are compromised by adversary. Simulation results indicate that our approach can effectively detect and defend the outlier attack.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can effectively employ different applications by collecting sensory information in hostile environments, such as enemy detection in battle fields or fire monitoring in urban areas [1] . However, sensor nodes are highly constrained in transmission power, on-board energy, processing capacity and storage, which requires careful resource management. Owing to the limited resources and operation in hostile environments, WSNs are subjected to numerous threats and are vulnerable to attacks from outside, for example, eavesdropping, or inside, for example, outliers.
Outliers (also called inside attackers) in WSNs are some sensor nodes that do not perform tasks as normal nodes but exhibit different types of abnormal behaviours, for example, dropping messages received from their neighbours, forwarding messages to enemy, broadcasting redundant messages and disseminating fake messages [2, 3] . Outliers also attack WSNs by tampering messages transferred in WSNs or generating bogus messages and forwarding them to critical nodes (e.g. aggregation nodes or sink node), which typically reduces network performance in terms of reliability and security because of the following consequences: (i) wasting network bandwidth, (ii) increasing energy consumption, (iii) interfusing illegal messages into sensory data streaming and (iv) causing communication obstruction or dynamic holes [4] .
In this paper, outliers are typically those sensors compromised and controlled by adversary. Adversary manipulates outliers to eavesdrop on the information of network or attack network with misbehaviours. However, since these attacks come from network inside, they are difficult to be distinguished by traditional cryptographic techniques [3] . Thus, it is critical to establish an efficient, secure and reliable scheme to detect and prevent outliers. To address this challenging issue, we propose a novel outlier detection and countermeasure scheme (ODCS) to detect and handle outliers in a hierarchical WSN (e.g. a clustered WSN [5] ).
First, in ODCS, we design an abnormal event observation mechanism (AEOM) which is used to detect the abnormal events, such as tampering attack and denial of service (DoS) attack. Observing the data converged on the cluster head, AEOM can surveille both exceptional messages and abnormal behaviours. Once AEOM detects abnormal event, it will invoke other two mechanisms to determine the authenticity of event, respectively. AEOM will further invoke an exceptional messages supervision mechanism (EMSM) to evaluate disparate messages based on statistical similarity [6] and spatiotemporal correlation of WSN. EMSM confirms inside attackers by utilising the correlations among one-hop neighbours, which have similar communication and computation workloads in a typical WSN with collaborative in-network processing (e.g. data aggregation). In EMSM, cluster head maintains a ring-list to store the history messages sent by its member nodes, and identify outlier by computing the 'message deviation'.
Furthermore, an abnormal behaviour supervision mechanism (ABSM) will be triggered by AEOM to conclude the misbehaviours of outliers (e.g. sending overloading/insufficient messages or forwarding message to doubtful target), by a k-means algorithm [7] based on an authentication scheme. ABSM also provides a one-hop neighbour authentication mechanism to determine further whether the node is an outlier by evaluating the frequency or target ID of the sent message.
Finally, several strategies for defending outliers are given in ODCS according to different attacks from outliers. Once the outlier is detected out, ODCS provides a reroute rule to avoid the misbehaviour attack as well as rekey mechanism to protect network from exceptional message attack. The reroute mechanism will establish a new path with creditable nodes to cluster head and bypass outliers, which can separate outliers from the network effectively; the rekey mechanism focuses on providing new keys and filtering outliers with a special function, and at the same time, the cluster head can authenticate member nodes, and then deploy a new key to the legitimate nodes. † ODCS provides a rerouting scheme and a rekey security scheme, respectively, for different types of attacks, which can separate outliers from normal sensors and enhance the robustness of network, even when some nodes are compromised by adversary.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents related works; Section 3 gives attacks model; Section 4 describes the system model and the security foundation; Section 5 describes the problem formulation, and ODCS is described in Section 6, including (i) two supervision mechanisms and (ii) the corresponding countermeasures. Sections 7 and 8 evaluate ODCS by having both security analysis and simulation, respectively. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section 9 with a summary of main ideas.
Related works
Outlier detection usually is a research issue in data management [13, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Hawkins [13] defines outlier as an observation that deviates a lot from other observations and can be generated from a different mechanism. Most of the previous works focus on the following three aspects [3] : (i) detection of exceptional message, (ii) detection of abnormal behaviour in routing and (iii) detection of intrusion in wireless networks.
Detection of exceptional message focuses on the messages that are remarkably different from other messages transferred
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IET Inf. Secur., 2010, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, pp. 361-373 in WSN [2, 8, 10] . In [2] , the authors develop a solution that (i) allows flexibility in a heuristic to detect outliers; (ii) works in-network and balances the proportional outcome in communication and (iii) is robust with respect to data and network change. However, it does not work well for the fine-granularity event with limited samples. In [8] , the authors identify the faulty sensor(s) using the aggregation tree including the maximum (max) and minimum (min) values of the sensed attribute and their locations. Therefore if any sensor reports a data value outside the [min, max] range, it can be identified as a faulty sensor. In [10] , the authors compute a running average and compare it with a threshold, which can be adjusted by a false alarm rate. In contrast, our solution improves the immunity of network from abnormal behaviours.
Detection of abnormal behaviour aims to defend the attacks, for example, spoofing and sink-hole. Some related works [3, 11, 13] have been conducted for WSNs. In [11] , the authors propose an in-network outlier cleaning approach that is accomplished during multi-hop data forwarding process and uses neighbouring relation. This approach guarantees that outliers can be either corrected or removed from further transmission. In [13] , the naïve Bayesian classification technique is utilised to detect outliers' misbehaviours in WSNs and also uses the spatiotemporal correlations, which are very important for detecting outliers with high accuracy. In [3] , the authors proposed an insider attacker detection scheme (IADS) in WSNs. IADS is purely localised and fitting to large-scale WSNs. By exploiting the spatial correlation among the networking behaviours of sensors in close proximity, IADS can achieve certain detection accuracy and a low false alarm rate as indicated by the extensive simulation study. But in IADS, some situations from the outlier (called as inside attacker in [3] ), such as the tampered message attack and provocateur attack, are not considered.
Detection of intrusion in wireless networks is studied in [14, 15] . In [14] , Zhang et al. proposed a scheme which is the first work on intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks. A new architecture is investigated for collaborative statistical anomaly detection, which provides protection from attacks. In [15] , an intrusion alarm is raised when the number of failures exceeds a pre-defined threshold. In this work, multiple rules are defined, and a decision is made based on a simple summation of the rule application results. Comparing with [14, 15] , our countermeasures can defend various attacks much better, and require no prior knowledge on normal/malicious sensor activities.
In short, most existing related works are for ad hoc networks and just focus on incomplete protection, which makes it insufficient for defending various attacks from outlier. Therefore our solution provides a more consummate scheme, which can detect attacks and defend the network from outlier in these three aspects.
Attacks model
Outliers can attack WSNs in various ways [22 -25] . In this section, we survey some attacks for WSNs as follows.
Provocateur attack:
A provocateur is a node compromised by adversary. Different from eavesdropping attack, provocateur aims to spread fake messages or eavesdrop on aggregated data by network to adversary. The outlier usually launches provocateur attack by tampering or generating fake messages or eavesdrop messages.
2. Sink-hole attacks: Sink-hole attacks are based on the idea that the nodes controlled by adversary attract the surrounding nodes with unfaithful routing information, and then alters the data passing through it.
3. Hello flood attack: Nodes broadcast hello messages to inform one-hop neighbours of their presence, which makes adversary can mount a hello flood and send them from an outlier. These replayed hello packets reach nodes so that the originating node cannot communicate with directly. Any node that uses the originating node as the next hop in a route but is not within that node's radio range would not be able to reliably forward traffic.
DoS attack:
In DoS attack, outliers overwhelm sensor nodes with either replayed packets or injected spurious packets and attempt to disrupt, subvert or destroy a network, which affects WSN on both the functionality and the overall performance.
Selective forwarding attack:
WSNs are usually multi-hop networks and assume that the participating nodes could forward the messages faithfully. Outliers, however, can refuse to route certain messages and drop them. If they drop all the packets through them, then it is called as black hole attack [26] . If they selectively forward the packets, it is called selective forwarding.
In summary, there are two typical types of attacks for outlier. The first type is exceptional message attack that attacks the network via tampering the message content or generating fake messages, such as provocateur attack. The second is abnormal behaviour attack that mainly attacks the network via dropping/forwarding messages to adversary or broadcasting redundant messages to waste energy and cause communication traffic, such as attacks (2), (3), (4) and (5) given above. Hence, detecting these attacks by taking the necessary countermeasures is helpful in maintaining or improving the performance of the application.
System model

Network model
In this paper, we consider a WSN consisting of a base station (BS) and large numbers of sensor nodes that can self-organise www.ietdl.org into clusters [4, 22, 27 -29] , as shown in Fig. 1 . The considered WSN can be represented as a graph G(V, E), where V ¼ {v 1 , . . . , v |V| } is a finite set of sensor nodes (vertices) and E ¼ {e 1 , . . . , e |E| } is a finite set of links (edges). Here, v i denotes a sensor node and an edge e ij indicates a communication link between the two given sensors v i and v j . We assume that outliers have the similar ability with normal nodes in terms of energy capacity and computation capability. Given
we call v j is v i 's direct neighbour node (one-hop node). Let N(v i ) represents the set of all v i 's direct neighbour nodes.
Each sensor x has a unique id ID x and can send/receive messages to/from N(ID x ). Let C i and CH i represent a cluster and a cluster head, respectively, where V ¼ C 1 < C 2 < . . . < C n , and C i > C j ¼ Ø. All nodes in a cluster are reachable by the cluster head through either direct communication or multi-hop relaying, which only uses short distance radio for transmission [2] . In each cluster, the selection of cluster head is randomised among all nodes in the cluster to avoid draining of the energy. Since wireless communications use a broadcast transmission medium, we assume that an adversary can eavesdrop on all traffics, inject packets and replay obsolete messages. If a node was compromised by adversary, all the information that it holds becomes known to the attacker.
Security foundation
4.2.1 Establishing pair-wise key: For WSN security, it is very important to establish a secure communication infrastructure. In our solution, the security foundation is that each sensor node x can establish pair-wise keys with N(ID x ), which is also used as the security foundation for research work in [30 -33] . We assume there exists a lower bound on the time interval T min that is necessary for an adversary to compromise a sensor node, and the time interval T est for a newly deployed sensor node to discover its immediate neighbours is smaller than T min (T min . T est ), especially in the initial phase of deployment.
Definition 1: One-way cryptographic hash function f K (x):
is a one-way cryptographic hash function, which utilises node x's identification ID x and previous key K as parameters to generate a new key via a deterministic procedure, which can take an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string.
The BS generates an initial key K I and loads each node with this key in time interval T est . As shown in Fig. 2 , when sensor nodes are deployed in WSN, each node u can use K I and hash function f to generate its master key
Once having gotten master key, nodes will erase K I . Note that the processing will be finished in T est , and the adversary cannot eavesdrop the network and obtain K I . After T est , although adversary could compromise a node, it just obtains the materials of the key of the compromised node, but not K I and information of other nodes. Afterwards, node u broadcasts an advertisement message (ID u , Nonce u ) containing a nonce Nonce u , and waits for v (v [ N(u)) to respond with ID v .
Definition 2: MAC(key, msg) is a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) of message msg which uses a symmetric key 'key '. A MAC algorithm accepts a secret key and an arbitrary length message as input to be authenticated, and outputs a MAC.
Once node v accepts the advertisement message, it will respond node u with (ID v , MAC(K v , ID v |Nonce u )) as follows.
At the same time, v can also generate the master key
Node u computes its pair-wise key, K uv as
, with v; also to node v and Thus, each node can use its neighbour nodes' IDs and pairwise key to decrypt the encrypted message by its neighbours, which means that every node can be authenticated by its immediate node.
Establishing cluster key:
Cluster key establishes a secure link between member nodes and cluster head. Similar to pair-wise keys, the cluster key is generated based on the master key and pair-wise key. Member node u and its cluster head CH can generate an initial cluster key K
, u encrypts and sends messages to the cluster head via a secure channel. Then the cluster head can decrypt them. However, some exceptional events will trigger rekey mechanism (described as follows). The security foundation provides an initial secure environment for network and will be utilised by other mechanisms.
Problem formulation
We assume there are m clusters,
, let d j represents the message from v j and f j represents the sending messages frequency of v j . We now formally define the outlier problem addressed in this paper. As mentioned earlier, an outlier represents a node whose observation is behaviourally distant from the rest of nodes on either content of messages or number of messages in WSN. We define two types of outliers as follows:
Definition 3: Given the frequency list is f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n (n . 0). Let f = 1/nS n i=1 f i and F (f ) = |f − f |. A node is called an F(t) outlier, if F (f ) . t, where t is a threshold which defines the deviation toleration of frequency.
Definition 4: Suppose the data list
represents the distance between data d and its kth nearest neighbour (k-NN) [34] . A node is called
. th, where th is a threshold that represents the deviation between two messages.
In defiance of the cryptological protection, outliers want to launch attack via tampering packets or sending abnormal amount of packets, which disseminates untruthful messages or causes abnormal traffics. Owing to the resourceconstrained sensors and the loose infrastructure of network, detection of outlier is not trivial. We establish a hierarchical architecture for the WSN, which can collect and analyse messages into cluster heads. Based on this architecture and the detection of outliers, we propose corresponding algorithms for detection of outliers with parameters t and th for Definitions 3 and 4, respectively. Considering the variety of applications in WSN, we adopt a heuristic method to generate these parameters.
ODCS scheme
In this section, we introduce the strategy to detect outlier and provide the corresponding countermeasures. The proposed ODCS scheme consists of four mechanisms: AEOM, EMSM, ABSM and countermeasures. Fig. 3 shows the architecture of ODCS. When a new message arrives at the cluster head, AEOM will authenticate it. Afterwards, AEOM uses a trigger mechanism that can discover abnormal events and trigger relevant mechanisms. Once AEOM detected an abnormal event, it will trigger EMSM or ABSM. EMSM and ABSM are responsible for abnormal behaviour and exceptional message, respectively. Once EMSM and ABSM confirmed the event, the countermeasure mechanism supports some efficient solutions. In Fig. 3 , M, T and w(ID x ) are assistant data sources and described later.
Abnormal event observation mechanism
For perceiving the abnormal events and invoking corresponding mechanisms, we design AEOM that is sensitive to abnormal events. An adversary can attack network by launching abnormal event, such as sending excessive messages to cause DoS attack, hello flood attack, and so on, or dropping normal message to achieve sinkhole attack, selective forwarding attack, and so on. AEOM surveilles the nodes' actions in the cluster and discovers the outlier that behaves abnormally.
Considering the limited storage of sensor, we design a storage architecture, a ring named M as shown in Fig. 4 , to store the latest history messages as the data frame of reference. Here history messages indicate those representative and recent accepted messages. 
In (1), G i (m new ) denotes the divergence between the new message and normal messages [35] , for example, the difference in temperature between the detected temperature and average temperature. According to (1) 
Outlier detection for F(t):
Outliers launch attack with abnormal transmission frequency, for example, too high or too low. To detect this type of attack, we can use k-means algorithm. In Euclidean space, the mean of transmission in a cluster can be computed by (2) as follows
Here t denotes the mean of history message frequency. Given a cluster C k , v i [ C k , the threshold, the differentia between a node message and the cluster mean (centroid) in frequency can be computed by (3) as follows
Here w v i denotes the frequency of one type of message from node ID i . In other words, it indicates how many messages that node v i has sent and different from freq, which denotes the frequency of one type of message for a cluster.
If diff (C k , t) is greater than the threshold value, it means that the node has sent too many or too few messages and is considered as an outlier candidate. Cluster head then invokes ABSM mechanism to identify it further. AEOM is shown in Fig. 5 .
Exceptional message supervision mechanism
Having detected the exceptional message, AEOM invokes the EMSM to further identify whether the messages are fake or not. EMSM mechanism is responsible for distinguishing false or fake messages to identify outliers. Based on the facts that nodes in WSNs are often in spatiotemporal correlation [8] , EMSM can utilise the characteristic to classify messages and distinguish suspicious messages.
Considering the constrained source, we design a temporal buffer named T for accumulating several coming messages as the frame of reference. Let T ¼ {(t i , w i )| (t 1 ,w 1 ), (t 2 ,w 2 ) , . . . , (t |T| , w |T| )}. Here, t i indicates a fresh message; w i is the frequency of t i . According to the cosine similarity [36] , we can compute the similarity between m new and t i , and then identify the m new 's attribute. The cosine similarity can effectively differentiate m new and t i according to the spatiotemporal correlation with high fine-grained
If similar messages come from different nodes, m new will be considered as a new type message and added to M; otherwise, it will be considered as a fake message and the node will be marked as an outlier. At the same time, cluster head will inform its members and BS. The process is shown in Fig. 6 .
Abnormal behaviour supervision mechanism
According to the discussion, the outliers often behave abnormally, such as (i) tampering messages from other members; (ii) dropping the messages that need to be forwarded to cluster head or other members, such as sinkhole attack and selective forwarding attack; (iii) broadcasting redundant messages to waste energy and cause communication traffics, for example, DoS attack and (iv) eavesdropping messages and leaking them to adversary. ABSM focuses on detecting these types of attacks.
Subsequently, for authenticating an outlier candidate, we propose a one-hop neighbour authentication mechanism. According to Definition 1, each node ID x which keeps its N(ID x ) can obtain w ID i that indicates the frequency of node ID j [ N(ID x ) and store them in a queue. Let w ID 2 ) , . . . , (ID m , w ID m )}, here w denotes a queue of the outlier candidate ID x 's neighbour nodes; m is the amount of ID x 's neighbour nodes. According to z-score theory [37] , the z-score method transforms an attribute value based on the mean and the standard deviation of the attribute. That is, the z-score of the value indicates how far and in which direction the value deviates from the mean value of the attribute, expressed in units of the standard deviation of the attribute. Therefore we can provide correct judgment based on the z-score method as follows
where m ID x and s ID x denote the mean and standard deviation of the neighbours of ID x , respectively, and w ID x represents the distance between the outlier and the population mean of w(ID x ) of the standard deviation. If w(ID x ) is negative when the w ID x is below the mean, the node will be reported to cluster head as a real outlier. Otherwise, the neighbours suggest cluster head to cancel the identification of outlier candidate.
Furthermore, if w ID i is high enough for collection, it means that the cluster head has gotten sufficient messages and then informs its members to pause or delay transmission. In this situation, if the member nodes still transfer messages out of controlling, it should be considered as an outlier. For the attack (4), the main task of eavesdropping is to forward messages to adversary's receivers, which means the target ID is different from other nodes, especially its neighbours. For each node, its neighbour nodes in the same cluster have the ability to authenticate the node's messages. Once the neighbour nodes parse the message and find its target ID that is different from theirs, the neighbour nodes will report the candidate outlier ID to cluster head.
Countermeasures
Since the inside attacks are not detectable and many of them attack network without decryption of messages [3] , it is insufficient to defend against the outlier only by cryptography-based techniques. Having detected the outliers, cluster head informs its members to refuse service to them and filter their messages simultaneously. In this subsection, we present a series of mechanisms for defending against diversified outlier attacks.
6.4.1 Defend against the tampering attack and deviant frequency attack: For the tampering attack and deviant frequency attack, for example, DoS and sink-hole, we adopt rejection rule. First, identified by above approaches and authenticated by cluster head, the outlier's ID will be announced in the cluster. Then the normal nodes will deliver messages via a new route and evade outlier as well as refuse its messages as shown in Fig. 7 . In Fig. 8 to defend against the sink-hole attack, the nodes in the set of w(ID outlier ) would exchange the old route information for establishing the new path. We design a reroute approach to prevent the attack.
and N(ID j ) know the outlier ID outlier . There were two ideal paths originally
As shown in Fig. 8 , to prevent from outlier, ID i in P 1 will rejoin new path P 2 as ID i ID j . . .
CH.
Considering the relationships among neighbours and cluster members are typically hierarchical, we choose breadth-first traversal (BFT) algorithm to establish new route. Since the communication in WSN has broadcasting characteristic and the cluster has very limited member nodes, BFT is very easily deployed. First, node ID i sends a reroute message to N(ID i ), each node in N(ID i ) will reply the message with the path information (e.g. the strong path of the node). ID i chooses a most suitable node as the next-hop node (e.g. the nearest node). We repeat this process until a new route to cluster head is established. The process for finding next-hop node is shown in Fig. 9 .
Defend against the provocateur attack:
To defend against the provocateur attack, we present a rekey mechanism that can support dynamic key to protect the network and filter the outliers [38] . Once the cluster head detects an outlier, it will inform the overall member nodes to rekey. Then the new generated cluster key replaces the obsolete one.
For rekeying normal nodes as well as filtering outlier, CH sends a control message ctl to inform its members to rekey as follows
The control message includes the ID of outlier. In order to avoid the outlier, we design a new function C( . ) as follows
ID outlier cannot recover the new key because C(ID outlier ) ¼ 0, and it does not have the ability to decrypt ctl and cannot rekey.
Thus, the network becomes secure by eliminating the outliers and retains the normal nodes. In addition, the rekey locally happens within a cluster, which improves the energy efficiency.
Security analysis
Comparing with the previous works, we focus on the outlier detection and present corresponding countermeasures to defend against the exceptional message attack and abnormal behaviour attack. First, we establish a secure environment by a random key pre-distribution, which makes nodes secure the link among immediate neighbours as well as supports the friendly relations among them in initial phase. Every node shares pair-wise keys with its direct neighbours and also establishes the relationship among nodes. The pair-wise keys are used for securing communications that require privacy or source authentication. For example, a node can use its pair-wise key to secure the transmission of its sensor readings to an aggregation node. Note that the use of pairwise keys precludes passive participation.
Secondly, in ODCS, EMSM uses similarity approach as well as spatiotemporal correlation to prevent the tampered messages or fake messages from malicious nodes. Based on the k-NN distance and cosine similarity formula, EMSM can detect the outlier out by the distinguished bogus messages efficiently. By adjusting the threshold value, EMSM can distinguish the messages in different granularities. Comparing with the history messages and current messages, respectively, EMSM can avoid those new messages considered as exceptional messages, which improves the reliability. The EMSM effectively defends against tampering message attack.
Finally, ABSM focuses on detecting the abnormal behaviour of node. Essentially, the abnormal behaviours often cause the traffic unconventionality in WSN by dropping or bursting messages or forwarding messages to discrediting targets. Computing the deviant frequency out, ABSM can locate the outlier and invoke the rekey mechanism. For rekeying the cluster, ABSM sends the control messages with filter function that can bypass the indicated sensors. ABSM can defend against the hello flood attack, the sink-hole attack, provocateur attack, and so on. Table 1 compares the performances of LEACH, IADS and ODCS in immunity. In this section, we evaluate the performance of supervision mechanisms. According to the requirements of LEACH, we designed a sensor network simulation incorporating with a hierarchical sensor network as the foundational environment by using C + + and MATLAB. We simulate a temperature monitoring system. In our simulation, we establish a 100 m × 100 m network, 100 nodes are set to detect the temperature in the region from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM. Detailed parameters of the simulations are shown in Table 2 [5].
In Table 2 , the E elec is for running the transmitter or receiver circuitry; the 1 amp is for the transmit amplifier. We assume that the outliers are distributed uniformly in the network. The outliers' misbehaviours are mainly expressed by tampering messages.
First, we establish and observe the attack model. We assume that outliers are very intelligent that they can send bogus messages mixed with normal messages. Fig. 10 shows a mixed-data model where outliers send about 80% fake messages (higher or lower than normal value). With the increase of the amount of the outlier, the data-lines deviate from normal curve increasingly. If outliers exceed 15%, the deviation is almost 0.58C, which indicates that the outliers seriously impact the results.
Furthermore, we employ ODCS and LADS on the attack model to evaluate them. Figs. 11 and 12 show the results of ODCS against IADS in different degree attacks. Although the two mechanisms have similar functions, the results, however, show ODCS has higher performance. In Fig. 11 , there are ten outliers in the network. Both ODCS and IADS can effectively detect and avoid the outliers. From  Fig. 11 , ODCS curve is closer to the normal curve than IADS curve, which indicates ODCS has higher precision than IADS. Meanwhile, ODCS curve almost close the Fig. 13 shows our approach can efficiently detect the inside attackers. When the outliers are below 30% in network, the amount of detection outliers is almost 95% by ODCS as well as 90% by IDAS. Typically, ODCS limits the communication range in one-hop local, but IDAS generally employs multi-hop (e.g. two-hop) sensors, which sometimes entangles more different events simultaneously and makes error judgment.
In Fig. 14 , the error detection of ODCS is about 5%, and for the error rate, there are two main reasons: first, the nodes have fault or are interfered by outside molestation, and the detection will be affected. In this situation, some sensors will emit interfered messages, which cause easily error judgment; sometimes the quantity of detection is more than the quantity of actual outlier; secondly, if there are more than two outliers in a cluster and send the fake messages at the same time, the supervision work becomes more difficult. In that situation, the spatiotemporal correlation cannot work well, especially when the outliers send similar messages. However, if the outliers are not neighbours or send different messages, we can distinguish them well by using the supervision mechanism.
For studying the performance further, we can adjust the distance parameter as threshold in both EMSM and ABSM as shown in Figs. 14 and 15. According to Definition 3 and ABSM, we adjust t as the parameter to detect outlier. When t is small, such as t ¼ 1, the strict condition makes cluster head catch some nodes whose messages have a little differentia affected by outside mistakenly and increases wrong outliers. On the contrary, if t is very big, ABSM cannot obtain detailed information about outliers, and some outliers will be ignored under the loose conditions. Therefore we can choose suitable parameter according to statistical method. In Fig. 15 , EMSM is similar to ABSM. However, it is more difficult to provide semantic criterion for judgment of exceptional messages.
Conclusion and future works
In this paper, an outlier detection approach ODCS is proposed to identify malicious nodes and consequently defend against outlier attacks by using corresponding countermeasures. Compared with other existing LEACHbased (cluster-based WSNs) security solutions, the Figure 14 To detect outliers by abnormal behaviours of ABSM Figure 15 To detect outliers by exceptional message of EMSM significant research contribution of this work is that the proposed ODCS can address outlier attack issues via interoperable mechanisms.
We propose to use AEOM to observe network. AEOM can distinguish the abnormal event and identify the potential outliers. Furthermore, triggered by AEOM, EMSM can distinguish the exceptional message by using distance measurement based on spatiotemporal correlation and consistency in some spatial granularity, for example, in one cluster. Similar to EMSM, ABSM can also be activated by AEOM to evaluate node behaviour via a frequency mechanism or target ID of message. The corresponding countermeasures can support effective approaches to defend against outliers. ODCS provides a local and efficient outlier detection scheme. Simulation results show that our approach can efficiently detect and defend against the outlier. Despite these benefits, several aspects of this approach need to be improved. Besides the aforementioned open issues, future research needs to consider the new node joining to improve the extension of WSN securely. Moreover, in the future, we will apply our approach to practical applications.
